Some interesting food for thought. First about the author because so many think everything is about politics...

"Stephen Sestanovich (born June 8, 1950) is an American government official, academic, and author. He is presently the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. His areas of expertise include Russia and the former Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and U.S. foreign policy.[1]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Sestanovich

Some of his thoughts....short so please give it a read....

"President Barack Obama reportedly says the odds of getting an acceptable nuclear deal with Iran are less than 50-50. I have no reason to doubt that estimate, and continuing delays in the Vienna negotiations reinforce it. Still, I’m going to take a chance and describe what I think will be three key areas of debate if an agreement is reached. Two are already much discussed; the third needs more attention.

. A Deal Would Disarm Us Psychologically. My fellow Think Tank contributor Ray Takeyh has warned that a deal grants Iran too much respectability and implicitly legitimizes its regional ambitions. I don’t buy it. The Obama administration knows a deal will sink unless it looks ready to stand up to Iran in the Middle East. Talk of détente? I expect to hear the opposite.

2. The Iranians Might Cheat. Critics ask whether we will be able to detect violations and respond effectively. Tehran has made this concern acute by (a) cheating in the past, and (b) demanding verification loopholes that could make it easier to cheat again. The talks are dragging on because Secretary of State John Kerry knows that he will need crisp and convincing answers on verifiability—and on how sanctions can be reimposed if cheating occurs.

3. The Iranians Might Not Cheat. There is, however, a more likely scenario than cheating–and it’s one more difficult to manage. Iran may actually abide by the deal. The tentative agreement reached in April, which has apparently not changed much, provided for 10 years of strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program and then a five-year glide path in which those limits are eased. President Obama has said that Iran will then be able to build a nuclear weapon on short notice. During this five-year period, as Iran reduces its “break out” time to nearly zero, Washington would be unable to claim that Tehran is violating the agreement.

Does the administration have an answer to the problem of Iranian compliance? Not yet, but here are two things it could say:


First, precisely because Iranian capabilities may expand after 10 years, the intrusive inspections provided by the deal will be essential. We have to know what Tehran is doing.

Second (and this will be much more controversial), the president could say now that, while the agreement allows Iran to reduce its break-out time after 10 years, the U.S. does not have to accept it. Washington could announce that, if Iran starts to expand its capabilities as the deal allows, whoever is president should renounce the agreement, seek new sanctions, and (you know the phrase) “put all options on the table.” Ideally, other governments negotiating the deal in Vienna would say the same thing.

Watch closely to see whether the administration can fashion a better answer to this problem than mine. If his answer is not at least as good, President Obama should expect to lose the debate."

Suppose Iran Doesn