By whom?

Certainly not by ATC or a qualified pilot.

Assumptions are dangerous
 

I have 35 years experience in this field. Comments about DEI are cruel and untrue. It often takes three years to complete on-the-job site specific certification. Nothing to do with skin or gender, either one is deemed capable. Or not. Dividing nation with untrue statements is irresponsible.
As to ‘ground radar’ when an aircraft is low, it takes a moment to ‘acquire’ on radar. Longer if ‘ground clutter’ is present (permanent structures that present on radar. We have an agency to sort out ‘why’s’. Maybe we should consider how safe and overworked the system is and has been during tenure of all past administrations. Once again, assumptions and listening to ‘one source’. God give peace to families and ATC staff who will have to live with this forever, even when found (if so) as no contributing factor to event. Listen, pause, think, wait. Assumptions are often cruel

A military and civilian aviation veteran explains Wednesday night's crash.
The author’s name is J.R. Rudy. He raises several issues I haven’t heard before, including the crosswinds that were swirling Wednesday night and the lack of a safety observer on the Black Hawk’s training mission. Beyond that - I’d rather let him speak for himself, unedited. - Alex Berenson
'I am responding to your recent note about input from pilots regarding the DCA crash.
I could go on for hours about this but will condense it the best I can without too much unsupported speculation.
I am a retired aviation professional with nearly 40 years of flying experience. The first 8 years I served as a Fighter Pilot flying the F-14 in the US Navy from aircraft carriers. Collateral duties included service as a Landing Signals Officer (the tower for the carrier) a Standardization Officer. I was one of the primary investigators into the mid-air collision of a TopGun F-16 and one of my squadron's F-14s. No jets or lives were lost.
After leaving the Navy, I flew domestically and internationally for Delta Air Lines for over 30 years, the last 20 out of JFK.
I have flown into DCA [Reagan National] countless times as a pilot, though not recently. I did land there about a week ago at 1130p, as a passenger, landing to the south flying the River Visual 19 approach. Challenging but fun, hand flown approach with a great view of DC from the port window seat.
I have ridden in but never piloted a helo, nor have I flown in one anywhere in the DCA helo corridor. Like other pilots and boaters on the Potomac, I have often seen helicopters there.
It is readily evident that the Army Blackhawk was flying visually, headed south on Helo Route 1, then transitioning to Route 4 abeam DCA. On the chart, there is a max altitude restriction of 200' from the Key Bridge to the Wilson Bridge on these two routes, inclusive of the area of the crash.
UH-60A and subsequent Black Hawks have VHF radios, just like commercial jets so separate UHF communication should not have been an issue.
Below there is a link to the Helo chart for the DC area below, showing the VFR helo corridor paths and altitude restrictions.
The accident appears to be a classic CRM "swiss cheese" multiple failure event, as are most aircraft accidents.
Any one of the following interventions could have prevented this accident:
-More timely, accurate and positive confirmation of traffic by an overtasked ATC [air-traffic control] controller.
-Adequate staffing in ATC tower.
-Black Hawk copilot/evaluator/instructor taking command of the aircraft or issuing timely instructions to correct altitude deviation.
-Observation/safety observer pilot aboard who is not wearing NVGs.
Not doing military training missions in busy airport approach corridor when a much safer less congested one is available to the south of DCA
-Use of collusion avoidance technology by the Black Hawk. Airliners have this and can visualize on screen potential threats, although this is low altitude inhibited.
-and most importantly, adherence to published altitudes.
-If the American commuter pilots had not accepted the side-step on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach from RW1 to RW 33 there would be no collision.
-If a single pilot was not wearing NVGs, the plane might have been visible.
-If the helo was on altitude, they may have been able to discern the aircraft lights unobscured in the night sky looking up rather than looking level into lights on the west shoreline.
From the limited info available I am able to draw a few conclusions.
1. The helo was flying higher than the max permitted 200'. Had they adhered to this altitude restriction the accident would not have happened.
2. The ATC controller apparently did not provide timely, accurate, complete advise to the helo of the commercial airline traffic on approach to DCA.
3. The ATC controller apparently was task-saturated, performing dual roles, perhaps at the end of a long shift when attentiveness wanes.
4. The American jet may have been belly up to the helo in the final part of his turn or in subsequent corrections to centerline due to #5.
5. Strong, gusty crosswinds winds of 25 knots may have necessitated to a steep turn of the American jet to prevent overshoot of centerline and also affected helo altitude control.
6. NVG use by both pilots may have rendered the American jet invisible due to oversaturation of background lighting emanating from the west side of the Potomac.
7. The helo exhibited an erratic flight path, executing two near 90 degree turns, turning west off course, crossing Haines Point and heading directly to the north end of DCA airport before turning back south along the river. Given the airspace, this is indicative of inexperience, unfamiliarity and possibly even incompetence.
8. The inability of the pilot to maintain altitude, especially on a clear night is highly indicative of aircraft unfamiliarity, lack of recent flying, and gross incompetence, likely exacerbated by the unpracticed use of NVGs.
9. Military pilots love to do low level flying, especially in cool places like up the Potomac River by DCA and the Capital at night and take risks.
10. The Warrant Officer instructor pilot may have had a possible hesitancy to correct a (new?) female Captain of unknown qualifications and experience and higher rank.
11. There appears to be zero accountability of the American commuter pilots in the accident. They were exactly where they should have been on the MV 01 approach and sidestep to the RW 33 visual approach.
The DCA Potomac corridor is not one to be used in training new and inexperienced pilots, who are not current and highly experienced with NVGs.
It is my sincere hope that the female pilot flying the helo earned her place in this unit, based on merit, and there are no DEI factors involved. This unit is a highly competitive, desired assignment that has traditionally been awarded to the best of the best for a non-combat tour.
I know this because my Army helo pilot brother-in-law was going to be assigned to this unit as a bonus tour following the completion of his helo instructor tour in Iran in 1979. This deployment ended poorly, given the revolution. He was killed in a military C-12 plane crash when escaping Iran. I believe his transport was shot down. If so, it was covered up by the Carter Administration to avoid fanning the flames of war, but that is another issue.
Disclaimer: I have used night vision scopes and a monocular, but have never worn military or civilian NVGs either when flying or on the ground.'

h
 

You all seem to say "human error". What about mechanical error? According to what I heard at the press conference last night, all the facts are not in and something said the BH was at 200 feet. Something may not have been calibrated correctly. And why is someone saying only two of the BH pilots were qualified? All three would have to be to be on that copter.

What is your source that the crew was not experienced?

Yes it is.
 

They did get a “traffic traffic” warning on TCAS. Almost too late to respond. Below 1000 ft the RA feature is inhibited. I am a retired Blackhawk pilot and 33 year airline pilot and have done that approach many times.

I said they were not HIGHLY experienced. 1000 flight hours as an instructor pilot (IP) is just an average or maybe less than average point and the 450 flight hours the co-pilot (PI) had is a fairly low experience point, especially when one considers that the co-pilot had been rated for a few years. I'm not saying they were not qualified - just that they were not a "been there done that" crew.

BTW, some on this thread have referred to a third pilot in the cabin. That is incorrect. The third crewmember was a crew chief, a non-rated crewmember. He would have been listening to the comms and had a primary duty to observe the environment and alert the pilots of any traffic and potential hazards. That is, of course, a shared responsibility with the pilots.

To expand on other points. As another poster stated, it is easy to lose a specific light source - the airliner - when there are many light sources in the area (light saturation). This is especially true when wearing NVGs and is why experienced goggle pilots sometimes look under the NVGs to get better situational awareness by looking for the red and green lights associated with aircraft.

Secondly, standard equipped Army helos do not have collision avoidance systems. IF this Blackhawk had TCAS or ADS B it would have been an addition made by that specific unit. I have not seen anything reported to indicate it was so equipped.

The airspace is three dimensional. The approach to runway 33 is VFR. Using the VASI the aircraft is at 400 to 500 feet agl over the river. The rotorcraft flyway is below 200 agl. No conflicts if everyone follows the rules. Someone did not follow the rules. At a descent rate of 700 feet per minute the airplane was about 43 seconds from a perfect happy landing. When time is up, it’s up.

Everyone can speculate all they want. It will likely take the NTSB a good year to have any definitive answers as to what caused the accident. Please remember to pray for the families that have lost their loved ones. In an accident like this they will likely not be able see their loved one again on this side of Heaven. I have been there. My husband was killed in a fiery plane crash 32 years ago. Not being able to physically see him made believing he was really dead very difficult and especially difficult for our four children. It makes “closure” pretty much impossible. So while you are speculating please remember to pray for all of the people who have completely lost life as they knew it in a blink of an eye.

The Airline Industry is messed up
 

It’s not noise, people are tired of the Airline industry’s poor performance. This time people died.

I flew to MCO from Newark on 12/28 and it was the strangest of all my past experiences. I have been delayed many times, rerouted to different cities, like Buffalo and held over. This time we were told to keep all the shades down for the entire flight. The flight was delayed 40 minutes to put needed supplies through the back of the plane. The flight could not take off without these “supplies”. We were asked to check our carry ons. Then the flight was delayed on the runways because there was too much traffic. The shades were not allowed to be opened at any time. Airline delays and cancellations are the normal now.
This was not the case 3 years ago when I moved to The Villages. Next rime I go to NY I’m taking a roomette on Amtrak. I am about done with flying.
I don’t know what the problems are, but there are problems. Time for the airline industry to make changes because what is happening now is inexcusable.

The article didn't say the 3rd crew-member wasn't Rated. The Chief of Staff for Army Aviation said he had "100's of hours of flight time".

The Chief of Staff of Army Aviation apparently disagrees with your contention that the Instructor was the PIC. He specifically said that the "Evaluated Pilot" was PIC (according to the press reports).

Also, there was no directive to wear NVG's. According to Retired CWO Jonathan Koziol who's been attached to the Unified Command Post to coordinate the investigation, the Army doesn't know if they were in use for the flight, but they were available in the aircraft.

https://6abc.com/post/army-black-haw...ence/15849913/

Accuracy matters and we all know the press accurately reports the facts.

Wow, I get the feeling you just scanned what I wrote so that you can disagree. The third crewmember WAS identified as the crew chief (non-rated crewmember), as would be normal.

"In a briefing with reporters on Thursday, Jonathan Koziol, chief of staff for Army aviation, said that the pilot commanding the flight was female with more than 500 hours of flight time. The male instructor pilot had over 1,000 hours of flight time, and the crew chief also had hundreds of hours of flight time."

That report of that briefing did say the female pilot was the PC. I'm curious if he said A PC or THE PC. As I carefully explained, one can be qualified as a PC but act as a PI on any particular flight. In any case, I was careful to say that IF the IP was INSTRUCTING then he was the PC. I stand by that comment. I can direct you to the paragraph in
AR 95-1 that directs this.

I can't imagine why a crew would have NVGs onboard and authorized and not use them but I suppose that is possible. I do not know if they were using them - nor do you.

One more thought. Kozoil's statements seem to me like he is polishing the turd. Spoken like a true desk jockey. I disagree with several of his statements but given his position he will be believed. Such is life.

From your post "Accuracy matters and we all know the press accurately reports the facts." Is that intended as sarcasm?

Agree that this is probably pilot error and can not disagree with the poster. No doubt that this is congested air space which makes the pilot error more likely to cause an accident.