[DeanFL]

Originally Posted by biker1

I asked a friend of mine, a recently retired commercial pilot, what he thought happened with the two crashes. He stated that it was lack of training as the pilots could have easily turned off the malfunctioning MCAS system.

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THAT is NOT TRUE - as documented in many places. The MCAS system was designed initially to NOT be 'turned off' - SOLELY automatic to avoid a stall. The first crash-Lion Air- the pilots had NO idea about the MCAS system - in ALL Boeing pilot literature the ONLY mention of MCAS was in the footnote as an acronym.

Apparently Boeing made a SW update after the Lion Air crash but it STILL did not allow the pilots of the 2nd crash to disengage. This is all documented in Boeing internal docs and flight recorders. The evidence had showed that the pilots CONTINUALLY tried to turn off the circuit breaker/power to the rear stabilizer to attempt to PULL UP, but when re-engaing the MCAS CONTINUALLY pushed the nose down, the pilots simply could not maintain control over the MCAS.

NOW - Boeing has the ability to disengage MCAS, on the latest one FAA 'certified'.

It would be as if Tesla had a serious design issue with its autonomous feature in its cars - but allowed the driver to turn the system off if it malfuntioned in any way....hopefully before a crash.
As mentioned prior, all this MCAS-stuff was incorporated to overcome basic design functions in placing the new larger engines more ahead of the wings and higher, causing aero balance stability issues. period.
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[biker1]

Sorry sport. I will believe my friend since he has domain expertise (as opposed to "Google experts"). Also, please stop yelling.

Originally Posted by DeanFL

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THAT is NOT TRUE - as documented in many places. The MCAS system was designed initially to NOT be 'turned off' - SOLELY automatic to avoid a stall. The first crash-Lion Air- the pilots had NO idea about the MCAS system - in ALL Boeing pilot literature the ONLY mention of MCAS was in the footnote as an acronym.

Apparently Boeing made a SW update after the Lion Air crash but it STILL did not allow the pilots of the 2nd crash to disengage. This is all documented in Boeing internal docs and flight recorders. The evidence had showed that the pilots CONTINUALLY tried to turn off the circuit breaker/power to the rear stabilizer to attempt to PULL UP, but when re-engaing the MCAS CONTINUALLY pushed the nose down, the pilots simply could not maintain control over the MCAS.

NOW - Boeing has the ability to disengage MCAS, on the latest one FAA 'certified'.

It would be as if Tesla had a serious design issue with its autonomous feature in its cars - but allowed the driver to turn the system off if it malfuntioned in any way....hopefully before a crash.
As mentioned prior, all this MCAS-stuff was incorporated to overcome basic design functions in placing the new larger engines more ahead of the wings and higher, causing aero balance stability issues. period.
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[New Englander]

Originally Posted by perrjojo

Yes, there was a design flaw but basically it was pilot error. All the pilot had to do was turn off auto pilot which should have been done as soon as a problem presented. No, I don’t work for Boeing

How do you know that the pilots didn't turn the auto pilot off?

[twoplanekid]

I would fly in the Boeing 737MAX as I once owned and flew an Eipper Quicksilver Weigh Shift all around Urbana, Ohio back in the days.



Eipper Formance Quicksilver Weight Shift antique ultralight vintage ultralight aircraft. - YouTube

[DeanFL]

Originally Posted by biker1

Sorry sport. I will believe my friend since he has domain expertise (as opposed to "Google experts"). Also, please stop yelling.

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sorry - emphasis - I mean EMPHASIS. The info & data related in my posts are not solely from so-called Google experts.

The pilots of Ethiopia Airlines Flight 302 apparently followed the proper steps to shut down an errant flight control system as they struggled to regain control of the 737 MAX aircraft shortly after takeoff. But according to multiple reports, data from the ill-fated aircraft’s flight recorder revealed that the anti-stall feature of the aircraft’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was triggered at least three times—and at least one time after the pilots followed the correct steps to shut it down.

Both Reuters and The Wall Street Journal report that the air crew followed procedures laid out by Boeing following the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX in October, according to officials briefed on the initial findings of the investigation. But the pilots failed to regain control of the system, and the MCAS was reactivated again—triggering yet another automated correction of the aircraft’s stabilizers that would have pushed the nose of the plane down.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) was commissioned by the Federal Aviation Authority in April to look into the agency’s oversight of the MCAS system.

An international panel of air safety regulators on Friday harshly criticized the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) review of a safety system on Boeing Co’s 737 Max jet that was later tied to two crashes that killed 346 people.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) was commissioned by the FAA in April to look into the agency’s oversight and approval of the so-called MCAS anti-stall system before the fatal crashes.

“The JATR team found that the MCAS was not evaluated as a complete and integrated function in the certification documents that were submitted to the FAA,” the 69-page report said.

“The lack of a unified top-down development and evaluation of the system function and its safety analyses, combined with the extensive and fragmented documentation, made it difficult to assess whether compliance was fully demonstrated.”

Boeing’s top-selling airplane has been grounded worldwide since a March 10 crash in Ethiopia killed 157 people, five months after a Lion Air 737 MAX crashed in Indonesia, killing 189 people on board.

The JATR draft report, obtained by Reuters ahead of its release on Friday, also said the FAA’s long-standing practice of delegating “a high level” of certification tasks to manufacturers like Boeing needs significant reforms to ensure adequate safety oversight.

“With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety,” the report said. “However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated with MCAS.”

FAA Administrator Steve DIckson said in a statement he would review the panel’s recommendations and take appropriate action following the “unvarnished and independent review of the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX.”


BTW - below a very good article explaining the issues>

Access Denied

[Challenger]

Yes However I am very picky about what airlines , I would fly on . No third world operators. These accidents would not have occurred with fully and appropriately trained pilots. Not absolving Boeing for their errors.

[biker1]

The MCAS system controls the trim. As I understand the system, the pilots can disable the automatic trim control. I believe that is what they should have done but failed to do. I will, of course, defer to any pilots who can expand on that, not “google experts”.

Originally Posted by DeanFL

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sorry - emphasis - I mean EMPHASIS. The info & data related in my posts are not solely from so-called Google experts.

The pilots of Ethiopia Airlines Flight 302 apparently followed the proper steps to shut down an errant flight control system as they struggled to regain control of the 737 MAX aircraft shortly after takeoff. But according to multiple reports, data from the ill-fated aircraft’s flight recorder revealed that the anti-stall feature of the aircraft’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was triggered at least three times—and at least one time after the pilots followed the correct steps to shut it down.

Both Reuters and The Wall Street Journal report that the air crew followed procedures laid out by Boeing following the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX in October, according to officials briefed on the initial findings of the investigation. But the pilots failed to regain control of the system, and the MCAS was reactivated again—triggering yet another automated correction of the aircraft’s stabilizers that would have pushed the nose of the plane down.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) was commissioned by the Federal Aviation Authority in April to look into the agency’s oversight of the MCAS system.

An international panel of air safety regulators on Friday harshly criticized the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) review of a safety system on Boeing Co’s 737 Max jet that was later tied to two crashes that killed 346 people.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) was commissioned by the FAA in April to look into the agency’s oversight and approval of the so-called MCAS anti-stall system before the fatal crashes.

“The JATR team found that the MCAS was not evaluated as a complete and integrated function in the certification documents that were submitted to the FAA,” the 69-page report said.

“The lack of a unified top-down development and evaluation of the system function and its safety analyses, combined with the extensive and fragmented documentation, made it difficult to assess whether compliance was fully demonstrated.”

Boeing’s top-selling airplane has been grounded worldwide since a March 10 crash in Ethiopia killed 157 people, five months after a Lion Air 737 MAX crashed in Indonesia, killing 189 people on board.

The JATR draft report, obtained by Reuters ahead of its release on Friday, also said the FAA’s long-standing practice of delegating “a high level” of certification tasks to manufacturers like Boeing needs significant reforms to ensure adequate safety oversight.

“With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety,” the report said. “However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated with MCAS.”

FAA Administrator Steve DIckson said in a statement he would review the panel’s recommendations and take appropriate action following the “unvarnished and independent review of the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX.”


BTW - below a very good article explaining the issues>

Access Denied

[DeanFL]

Originally Posted by biker1

The MCAS system controls the trim. As I understand the system, the pilots can disable the automatic trim control. I believe that is what they should have done but failed to do. I will, of course, defer to any pilots who can expand on that, not “google experts”.

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not really>>>

The JATR said, "MCAS used the stabilizer to change the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the FAA. If the FAA technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function, the JATR team believes the agency likely would have required an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it had not previously been used; this [might have] identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is an automated flight control developed by Boeing which became notorious for its role in two fatal accidents of the Boeing 737 MAX before the aircraft was grounded worldwide. First deployed on the Boeing KC-46 Air Force tanker, the MCAS software flight control law adjusts the horizontal stabilizer to push the nose down when the aircraft is operating in manual flight with flaps up at an elevated angle of attack (AoA), so the pilot will not inadvertently pull the airplane up too steeply, potentially causing a stall. In both crashes, MCAS was activated by an erroneous indication from an AoA sensor on the exterior of the airplane. (that single point of failure - stupidly intergrated into the MCAS system software).

During certification of the MAX, Boeing removed a description of MCAS from the flight manuals, leaving pilots unaware of the system when the airplane entered service. On November 10, 2018, twelve days after the first crash, Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing publicly revealed MCAS in a discussion with airline operators and other aviation interests. A recovery procedure highlighted by Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after the Lion Air accident failed to prevent the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which led to the global grounding of all 737 MAX aircraft pending investigations and software fixes.

In April 2019, Boeing admitted that the MCAS played a role in both accidents and asserted that MCAS is not an anti-stall system. On the Boeing 737 MAX, MCAS was intended to mimic pitching behavior similar to aircraft in the previous generation of the series, the Boeing 737 NG. The investigations identified numerous defects with associated systems, including a non-functioning AoA disagree message that could have alerted pilots to a problem. The Wall Street Journal reported that Boeing had failed to share information about that issue for "about a year" before the Lion Air crash. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was implemented on the 737 MAX to mitigate the aircraft's tendency to pitch up because of the aerodynamic effect of its larger, heavier, and more powerful CFM LEAP-1B engines and nacelles. The stated goal of MCAS, according to Boeing, was to provide consistent aircraft handling characteristics at elevated angles of attack in certain unusual flight conditions only and hence make the 737 MAX perform similarly to its immediate predecessor, the 737NG. (Thus Boeing's attempt to NOT include MCAS in any MAX operational documention for airlines and pilots , fast-track the FAA approvals, and not requiring airlines to invest $$$$ in additional pilot training for the MAX.)
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[biker1]

Not what my commercial pilot friend stated. Again, a real pilot vs. "google expert". MCAS does trim out the plane and this can be deactivated. Better trained pilots would have meant no crashes. Straight from the horse's mouth.

Originally Posted by DeanFL

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not really>>>

The JATR said, "MCAS used the stabilizer to change the column force feel, not trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the control surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the FAA. If the FAA technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function, the JATR team believes the agency likely would have required an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it had not previously been used; this [might have] identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is an automated flight control developed by Boeing which became notorious for its role in two fatal accidents of the Boeing 737 MAX before the aircraft was grounded worldwide. First deployed on the Boeing KC-46 Air Force tanker, the MCAS software flight control law adjusts the horizontal stabilizer to push the nose down when the aircraft is operating in manual flight with flaps up at an elevated angle of attack (AoA), so the pilot will not inadvertently pull the airplane up too steeply, potentially causing a stall. In both crashes, MCAS was activated by an erroneous indication from an AoA sensor on the exterior of the airplane. (that single point of failure - stupidly intergrated into the MCAS system software).

During certification of the MAX, Boeing removed a description of MCAS from the flight manuals, leaving pilots unaware of the system when the airplane entered service. On November 10, 2018, twelve days after the first crash, Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing publicly revealed MCAS in a discussion with airline operators and other aviation interests. A recovery procedure highlighted by Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) after the Lion Air accident failed to prevent the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, which led to the global grounding of all 737 MAX aircraft pending investigations and software fixes.

In April 2019, Boeing admitted that the MCAS played a role in both accidents and asserted that MCAS is not an anti-stall system. On the Boeing 737 MAX, MCAS was intended to mimic pitching behavior similar to aircraft in the previous generation of the series, the Boeing 737 NG. The investigations identified numerous defects with associated systems, including a non-functioning AoA disagree message that could have alerted pilots to a problem. The Wall Street Journal reported that Boeing had failed to share information about that issue for "about a year" before the Lion Air crash. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was implemented on the 737 MAX to mitigate the aircraft's tendency to pitch up because of the aerodynamic effect of its larger, heavier, and more powerful CFM LEAP-1B engines and nacelles. The stated goal of MCAS, according to Boeing, was to provide consistent aircraft handling characteristics at elevated angles of attack in certain unusual flight conditions only and hence make the 737 MAX perform similarly to its immediate predecessor, the 737NG. (Thus Boeing's attempt to NOT include MCAS in any MAX operational documention for airlines and pilots , fast-track the FAA approvals, and not requiring airlines to invest $$$$ in additional pilot training for the MAX.)
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[dewilson58]

Originally Posted by biker1

Not what my commercial pilot friend stated. Again, a real pilot vs. "google expert". MCAS does trim out the plane and this can be deactivated. Better trained pilots would have meant no crashes. Straight from the horse's mouth.

Heard the same from a pilot friend (yes, I have friends).

[JoMar]

Originally Posted by biker1

Not what my commercial pilot friend stated. Again, a real pilot vs. "google expert". MCAS does trim out the plane and this can be deactivated. Better trained pilots would have meant no crashes. Straight from the horse's mouth.

Just a curious question......has your real pilot every flown the MAX or operated the MCAS system? I suspect not and he is providing information based on his experience in older Boeing aircraft? I also have a real pilot friend, retired Delta captain, and his comment is he wouldn't comment because he never flew the plane or the system and anything he would say would be speculation. He retired 12 years ago. There are also two youtube channels, one is Mentour Pilot who is a 737 pilot and he has done extensive coverage of the system and the other is the blancolirio channel, a current 777 pilot who dissects the NTSB and FAA reports.

[DeanFL]

Originally Posted by biker1

Not what my commercial pilot friend stated. Again, a real pilot vs. "google expert". MCAS does trim out the plane and this can be deactivated. Better trained pilots would have meant no crashes. Straight from the horse's mouth.

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please - it's very demeaning - the google expert crap.
Why must folks be so angry?

please do YOUR research as I did and many others. Read the Boeing documents, read the FAA reports, read the Investigative Committee's findings, read independent Aeronautical experts findings, and so much more information and data.

The 'better pilot training' argument is just hollow and untrue - this has been completely rebunked. It was determined to be a scapegoat attempt early on in the initial investigations, but proved untrue.

September 16, 2020
After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX
From the Report: “The MAX crashes were… a horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA”

Washington, D.C. — Today, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the Committee’s final report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report, prepared by Majority Staff, lays out the serious flaws and missteps in the design, development, and certification of the aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months of each other that killed a total of 346 people, including eight Americans.

The Committee’s 238-page report, which points to repeated and serious failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), contains five central themes and includes more than six dozen investigative findings. These themes include:

Production pressures that jeopardized the safety of the flying public. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus’ new A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line.
Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS, the software designed to automatically push the airplane’s nose down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that MCAS existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction.
Culture of Concealment. Boeing withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the pilot described as “catastrophic.” Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond to this condition within four seconds.
Conflicted Representation. The FAA’s current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public. The report documents multiple instances in which Boeing employees who have been authorized to perform work on behalf of the FAA failed to alert the FAA to potential safety and/or certification issues.
Boeing’s Influence Over the FAA’s Oversight Structure. Multiple career FAA officials have documented examples where FAA management overruled a determination of the FAA’s own technical experts at the behest of Boeing. These examples are consistent with results of a recent draft FAA employee “safety culture” survey that showed many FAA employees believed its senior leaders are more concerned with helping industry achieve its goals and are not held accountable for safety-related decisions.
“Our report lays out disturbing revelations about how Boeing—under pressure to compete with Airbus and deliver profits for Wall Street—escaped scrutiny from the FAA, withheld critical information from pilots, and ultimately put planes into service that killed 346 innocent people. What’s particularly infuriating is how Boeing and FAA both gambled with public safety in the critical time period between the two crashes,” Chair DeFazio said. “On behalf of the families of the victims of both crashes, as well as anyone who steps on a plane expecting to arrive at their destination safely, we are making this report public to put a spotlight not only on the broken safety culture at Boeing but also the gaps in the regulatory system at the FAA that allowed this fatally-flawed plane into service. Critically, our report gives Congress a roadmap on the steps we must take to reinforce aviation safety and regulatory transparency, increase Federal oversight, and improve corporate accountability to help ensure the story of the Boeing 737 MAX is never, ever repeated.”

“The Committee’s thorough investigation uncovered errors that are difficult to hear, but necessary to confront about the 737 MAX certification,” Chair Larsen said. “This report, combined with the findings and recommendations from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations, National Transportation Safety Board, Joint Authorities Technical Review and other entities, serve as a roadmap for changes to the FAA certification process. The 346 victims of the two tragic crashes and their families, as well as the traveling public rightfully expect Congress to act. As the Committee moves into the next phase of oversight, I will continue to work with Chair DeFazio and my colleagues to address the significant cultural and structural deficiencies identified in the report in order to improve safety.”
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[biker1]

There is nothing that you posted that is contrary to what my pilot friend told me. If anyone appears to be angry, it is you, as demonstrated by your yelling in posts. I am simply relying what someone with domain expertise told me. If you don't want to believe him then fine but please stop with the OCD behavior.

Originally Posted by DeanFL

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.
please - it's very demeaning - the google expert crap.
Why must folks be so angry?

please do YOUR research as I did and many others. Read the Boeing documents, read the FAA reports, read the Investigative Committee's findings, read independent Aeronautical experts findings, and so much more information and data.

The 'better pilot training' argument is just hollow and untrue - this has been completely rebunked. It was determined to be a scapegoat attempt early on in the initial investigations, but proved untrue.

September 16, 2020
After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX
From the Report: “The MAX crashes were… a horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA”

Washington, D.C. — Today, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the Committee’s final report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report, prepared by Majority Staff, lays out the serious flaws and missteps in the design, development, and certification of the aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months of each other that killed a total of 346 people, including eight Americans.

The Committee’s 238-page report, which points to repeated and serious failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), contains five central themes and includes more than six dozen investigative findings. These themes include:

Production pressures that jeopardized the safety of the flying public. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus’ new A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line.
Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS, the software designed to automatically push the airplane’s nose down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that MCAS existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction.
Culture of Concealment. Boeing withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the pilot described as “catastrophic.” Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond to this condition within four seconds.
Conflicted Representation. The FAA’s current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public. The report documents multiple instances in which Boeing employees who have been authorized to perform work on behalf of the FAA failed to alert the FAA to potential safety and/or certification issues.
Boeing’s Influence Over the FAA’s Oversight Structure. Multiple career FAA officials have documented examples where FAA management overruled a determination of the FAA’s own technical experts at the behest of Boeing. These examples are consistent with results of a recent draft FAA employee “safety culture” survey that showed many FAA employees believed its senior leaders are more concerned with helping industry achieve its goals and are not held accountable for safety-related decisions.
“Our report lays out disturbing revelations about how Boeing—under pressure to compete with Airbus and deliver profits for Wall Street—escaped scrutiny from the FAA, withheld critical information from pilots, and ultimately put planes into service that killed 346 innocent people. What’s particularly infuriating is how Boeing and FAA both gambled with public safety in the critical time period between the two crashes,” Chair DeFazio said. “On behalf of the families of the victims of both crashes, as well as anyone who steps on a plane expecting to arrive at their destination safely, we are making this report public to put a spotlight not only on the broken safety culture at Boeing but also the gaps in the regulatory system at the FAA that allowed this fatally-flawed plane into service. Critically, our report gives Congress a roadmap on the steps we must take to reinforce aviation safety and regulatory transparency, increase Federal oversight, and improve corporate accountability to help ensure the story of the Boeing 737 MAX is never, ever repeated.”

“The Committee’s thorough investigation uncovered errors that are difficult to hear, but necessary to confront about the 737 MAX certification,” Chair Larsen said. “This report, combined with the findings and recommendations from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations, National Transportation Safety Board, Joint Authorities Technical Review and other entities, serve as a roadmap for changes to the FAA certification process. The 346 victims of the two tragic crashes and their families, as well as the traveling public rightfully expect Congress to act. As the Committee moves into the next phase of oversight, I will continue to work with Chair DeFazio and my colleagues to address the significant cultural and structural deficiencies identified in the report in order to improve safety.”
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[biker1]

There is nothing that you posted that is contrary to what my pilot friend told me. I will repeat: he told me that if the pilots were better trained there would not have been crashes. He did not say the plane did not have a serious design problem. If anyone appears to be angry, it is you, as demonstrated by your yelling in posts. I am simply relying what someone with domain expertise told me. If you don't want to believe him then fine but please stop with the OCD behavior. I find it interesting that the crashes were with airlines from third-world countries.

Originally Posted by DeanFL

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.
please - it's very demeaning - the google expert crap.
Why must folks be so angry?

please do YOUR research as I did and many others. Read the Boeing documents, read the FAA reports, read the Investigative Committee's findings, read independent Aeronautical experts findings, and so much more information and data.

The 'better pilot training' argument is just hollow and untrue - this has been completely rebunked. It was determined to be a scapegoat attempt early on in the initial investigations, but proved untrue.

September 16, 2020
After 18-Month Investigation, Chairs DeFazio and Larsen Release Final Committee Report on Boeing 737 MAX
From the Report: “The MAX crashes were… a horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA”

Washington, D.C. — Today, Chair of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the Committee’s final report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report, prepared by Majority Staff, lays out the serious flaws and missteps in the design, development, and certification of the aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months of each other that killed a total of 346 people, including eight Americans.

The Committee’s 238-page report, which points to repeated and serious failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), contains five central themes and includes more than six dozen investigative findings. These themes include:

Production pressures that jeopardized the safety of the flying public. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus’ new A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line.
Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS, the software designed to automatically push the airplane’s nose down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that MCAS existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction.
Culture of Concealment. Boeing withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the pilot described as “catastrophic.” Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond to this condition within four seconds.
Conflicted Representation. The FAA’s current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public. The report documents multiple instances in which Boeing employees who have been authorized to perform work on behalf of the FAA failed to alert the FAA to potential safety and/or certification issues.
Boeing’s Influence Over the FAA’s Oversight Structure. Multiple career FAA officials have documented examples where FAA management overruled a determination of the FAA’s own technical experts at the behest of Boeing. These examples are consistent with results of a recent draft FAA employee “safety culture” survey that showed many FAA employees believed its senior leaders are more concerned with helping industry achieve its goals and are not held accountable for safety-related decisions.
“Our report lays out disturbing revelations about how Boeing—under pressure to compete with Airbus and deliver profits for Wall Street—escaped scrutiny from the FAA, withheld critical information from pilots, and ultimately put planes into service that killed 346 innocent people. What’s particularly infuriating is how Boeing and FAA both gambled with public safety in the critical time period between the two crashes,” Chair DeFazio said. “On behalf of the families of the victims of both crashes, as well as anyone who steps on a plane expecting to arrive at their destination safely, we are making this report public to put a spotlight not only on the broken safety culture at Boeing but also the gaps in the regulatory system at the FAA that allowed this fatally-flawed plane into service. Critically, our report gives Congress a roadmap on the steps we must take to reinforce aviation safety and regulatory transparency, increase Federal oversight, and improve corporate accountability to help ensure the story of the Boeing 737 MAX is never, ever repeated.”

“The Committee’s thorough investigation uncovered errors that are difficult to hear, but necessary to confront about the 737 MAX certification,” Chair Larsen said. “This report, combined with the findings and recommendations from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations, National Transportation Safety Board, Joint Authorities Technical Review and other entities, serve as a roadmap for changes to the FAA certification process. The 346 victims of the two tragic crashes and their families, as well as the traveling public rightfully expect Congress to act. As the Committee moves into the next phase of oversight, I will continue to work with Chair DeFazio and my colleagues to address the significant cultural and structural deficiencies identified in the report in order to improve safety.”
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[PennBF]

As a very frequent flyer and experienced many many issue with flights, as they say the bottom line is why risk your life with out knowing the aircraft is totally safe? I have read some comments which have said, "in my opinion", "CBS has reported", "the pilots could have...", "I know a pilot and he/she said", etc etc. Not one of these person's and the many others who commented were on the plane, or in the cockpit so all is a guess! Some poster's say it was the MCAS, some say it was pilot error, some blame the stabilizer, some say it could have been be avoided if only the pilots did XYZ, some say it was moving the engines up on the wings, some even say it was all these things. Again, bottom line..Why ever get on a plane that "may have one or many" of these potential faults? Proof is in the pudding. Show me 2 or more years of flight time without any serious report able problems and it "may" be prudent to fly on that aircraft!!! Otherwise, why risk your life without solid facts and multi hours of problem free aircraft issues. I then may get on one of these suspect planes.