Talk of The Villages Florida - Rentals, Entertainment & More
Talk of The Villages Florida - Rentals, Entertainment & More
#31
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My uncle was one of the fire chiefs responding to the crash of Flight 191 on May 25, 1979. My heart goes out to the responders and other people involved in finding the cause and dealing with the trauma caused by this tragic accident.
My uncle was quite upset as he told me about his memories dealing with American Airlines Flight 191. The facts will come out with this Potomac River crash. You have a lot of people digging for how this happened. Last edited by Taltarzac725; 02-02-2025 at 08:16 AM. |
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#32
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Gray News) - The Army has identified the third soldier who was inside the Black Hawk helicopter involved in Wednesday’s deadly DC plane crash that killed 67 people.
Officials identified the soldier as Cpt. Rebecca M. Lobach of Durham, North Carolina. Lobach served as an aviation officer in the Army from July 2019 and had around 500 hours of flying time in the Black Hawk under her belt. From: ‘We are devastated’: Cpt. Rebecca Lobach identified as third Black Hawk pilot who died in DC plane crash
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"No one is more hated than he who speaks the truth." Plato “To argue with a person who has renounced the use of reason is like administering medicine to the dead.” Thomas Paine |
#33
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-BH pilots using night vision in a potentially congested area -non-specific comms from ATC to BH pilots re visual on Regional jet - there was actually 2 RJs in the immediate area. -Did the ATC view/respond to instrument/radar tracking of the BH critically on a line to the Regional jet? |
#34
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According to this report: Who Was Black Hawk Helicopter Pilot in DC Plane Crash? What We Know - Newsweek
All 3 people in the Black Hawk were pilots? 2 with "hundreds of hours" and 1 with "over 1000 hours"? How could 3 qualified pilots, all in communication with each other, not properly identify an airplane in the air? There was another similar airplane in the air space and on the approach, but for all 3 to make the same mistake? |
#35
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#36
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Identifying another aircraft in the area, is just a basic, human activity. Everyone in the aircraft was privy to ATC communications. Human nature suggests that when they were asked if the "have the CRJ in view", all 3 would have looked for it and confirmed to ATC and each other, they have it in sight. They confirmed a visual, twice. BTW, for those who haven't seen a professional recap of what happened, you can find it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RzQe6W7vcu4. Pilot Debrief is one of the most respected sources for information on aircraft accidents. |
#37
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Personally I do not think helicopters should be anywhere near flight paths of planes. |
#38
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As many have stated they do not have all the facts as yet.
The one fact that does exist is that there is always an unexpected accident waiting around the corner. It's good for them to investigate exactly what happen to see if it can be prevented in the future. But to investigate to place blame on someone is a waste of time, that will not bring those lost people back. |
#39
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#40
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In that congested DCA area, Collision Avoidance signals are considered false positives. They should make DCA a military base and make the DC Parasites fly into Dulles. The Helicopter was flying too high for some reason...that was the error.
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#41
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Certainly not by ATC or a qualified pilot. |
#42
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I have 35 years experience in this field. Comments about DEI are cruel and untrue. It often takes three years to complete on-the-job site specific certification. Nothing to do with skin or gender, either one is deemed capable. Or not. Dividing nation with untrue statements is irresponsible.
As to ‘ground radar’ when an aircraft is low, it takes a moment to ‘acquire’ on radar. Longer if ‘ground clutter’ is present (permanent structures that present on radar. We have an agency to sort out ‘why’s’. Maybe we should consider how safe and overworked the system is and has been during tenure of all past administrations. Once again, assumptions and listening to ‘one source’. God give peace to families and ATC staff who will have to live with this forever, even when found (if so) as no contributing factor to event. Listen, pause, think, wait. Assumptions are often cruel |
#43
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A military and civilian aviation veteran explains Wednesday night's crash.
The author’s name is J.R. Rudy. He raises several issues I haven’t heard before, including the crosswinds that were swirling Wednesday night and the lack of a safety observer on the Black Hawk’s training mission. Beyond that - I’d rather let him speak for himself, unedited. - Alex Berenson 'I am responding to your recent note about input from pilots regarding the DCA crash. I could go on for hours about this but will condense it the best I can without too much unsupported speculation. I am a retired aviation professional with nearly 40 years of flying experience. The first 8 years I served as a Fighter Pilot flying the F-14 in the US Navy from aircraft carriers. Collateral duties included service as a Landing Signals Officer (the tower for the carrier) a Standardization Officer. I was one of the primary investigators into the mid-air collision of a TopGun F-16 and one of my squadron's F-14s. No jets or lives were lost. After leaving the Navy, I flew domestically and internationally for Delta Air Lines for over 30 years, the last 20 out of JFK. I have flown into DCA [Reagan National] countless times as a pilot, though not recently. I did land there about a week ago at 1130p, as a passenger, landing to the south flying the River Visual 19 approach. Challenging but fun, hand flown approach with a great view of DC from the port window seat. I have ridden in but never piloted a helo, nor have I flown in one anywhere in the DCA helo corridor. Like other pilots and boaters on the Potomac, I have often seen helicopters there. It is readily evident that the Army Blackhawk was flying visually, headed south on Helo Route 1, then transitioning to Route 4 abeam DCA. On the chart, there is a max altitude restriction of 200' from the Key Bridge to the Wilson Bridge on these two routes, inclusive of the area of the crash. UH-60A and subsequent Black Hawks have VHF radios, just like commercial jets so separate UHF communication should not have been an issue. Below there is a link to the Helo chart for the DC area below, showing the VFR helo corridor paths and altitude restrictions. The accident appears to be a classic CRM "swiss cheese" multiple failure event, as are most aircraft accidents. Any one of the following interventions could have prevented this accident: -More timely, accurate and positive confirmation of traffic by an overtasked ATC [air-traffic control] controller. -Adequate staffing in ATC tower. -Black Hawk copilot/evaluator/instructor taking command of the aircraft or issuing timely instructions to correct altitude deviation. -Observation/safety observer pilot aboard who is not wearing NVGs. Not doing military training missions in busy airport approach corridor when a much safer less congested one is available to the south of DCA -Use of collusion avoidance technology by the Black Hawk. Airliners have this and can visualize on screen potential threats, although this is low altitude inhibited. -and most importantly, adherence to published altitudes. -If the American commuter pilots had not accepted the side-step on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach from RW1 to RW 33 there would be no collision. -If a single pilot was not wearing NVGs, the plane might have been visible. -If the helo was on altitude, they may have been able to discern the aircraft lights unobscured in the night sky looking up rather than looking level into lights on the west shoreline. From the limited info available I am able to draw a few conclusions. 1. The helo was flying higher than the max permitted 200'. Had they adhered to this altitude restriction the accident would not have happened. 2. The ATC controller apparently did not provide timely, accurate, complete advise to the helo of the commercial airline traffic on approach to DCA. 3. The ATC controller apparently was task-saturated, performing dual roles, perhaps at the end of a long shift when attentiveness wanes. 4. The American jet may have been belly up to the helo in the final part of his turn or in subsequent corrections to centerline due to #5. 5. Strong, gusty crosswinds winds of 25 knots may have necessitated to a steep turn of the American jet to prevent overshoot of centerline and also affected helo altitude control. 6. NVG use by both pilots may have rendered the American jet invisible due to oversaturation of background lighting emanating from the west side of the Potomac. 7. The helo exhibited an erratic flight path, executing two near 90 degree turns, turning west off course, crossing Haines Point and heading directly to the north end of DCA airport before turning back south along the river. Given the airspace, this is indicative of inexperience, unfamiliarity and possibly even incompetence. 8. The inability of the pilot to maintain altitude, especially on a clear night is highly indicative of aircraft unfamiliarity, lack of recent flying, and gross incompetence, likely exacerbated by the unpracticed use of NVGs. 9. Military pilots love to do low level flying, especially in cool places like up the Potomac River by DCA and the Capital at night and take risks. 10. The Warrant Officer instructor pilot may have had a possible hesitancy to correct a (new?) female Captain of unknown qualifications and experience and higher rank. 11. There appears to be zero accountability of the American commuter pilots in the accident. They were exactly where they should have been on the MV 01 approach and sidestep to the RW 33 visual approach. The DCA Potomac corridor is not one to be used in training new and inexperienced pilots, who are not current and highly experienced with NVGs. It is my sincere hope that the female pilot flying the helo earned her place in this unit, based on merit, and there are no DEI factors involved. This unit is a highly competitive, desired assignment that has traditionally been awarded to the best of the best for a non-combat tour. I know this because my Army helo pilot brother-in-law was going to be assigned to this unit as a bonus tour following the completion of his helo instructor tour in Iran in 1979. This deployment ended poorly, given the revolution. He was killed in a military C-12 plane crash when escaping Iran. I believe his transport was shot down. If so, it was covered up by the Carter Administration to avoid fanning the flames of war, but that is another issue. Disclaimer: I have used night vision scopes and a monocular, but have never worn military or civilian NVGs either when flying or on the ground.' |
#44
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You all seem to say "human error". What about mechanical error? According to what I heard at the press conference last night, all the facts are not in and something said the BH was at 200 feet. Something may not have been calibrated correctly. And why is someone saying only two of the BH pilots were qualified? All three would have to be to be on that copter.
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#45
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Closed Thread |
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